## Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000400080012-8

14 September 1976

MEMORANDUM	FOR: Executive Secretary, Secu	rity Committee
SUBJECT	: Vote Sheet Action	
REFERENCE	: Definition of "Extremely So Foreign Intelligence Sour	
DUE DATE	: COB, 24 September 1976	
l. In reg	gard to referenced document:	
.a.	I concur.	
b.	I concur, subject to the comments or amendments set forth below in para 2.	
c.	I disapprove. See comments below.	X
d.	I abstain	
2. Com	ments or amendments:*	

See attached

Signature

NSA Member

Title

National Security Agency
Agency

Agency

30 September 1976

Date

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\* May necessitate classification and control of this memorandum.

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- a. In addition to our prior dissent to the language of the SECOM version of paragraph 4, we do not concur in the inclusion of the words "Foreign Intelligence" in any version of paragraph 4. We believe that we should adhere to the language of EO 11905 and Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, i.e., sources and methods of intelligence or intelligence sources and methods. The term "sources and methods of SCI" is an acceptable statement which is unnecessarily complicated by the addition of the term "Foreign Intelligence".
- b. We do not concur in the proposed definition. Neither do we agree that the addition of a definition responds appropriately to the charge of the NFIB with respect to identifying the categories envisioned in the last sentence of paragraph 4. The definition lacks the specificity that would permit uniform application by SIOs. It appears that the Subcommittee should have recommended new language for the last sentence to indicate the relationship of the definition to the charge in the sentence.
- c. We do not concur in the use in the document of such qualifiers as "specific and deep," and "extremely". These words have the affect of limiting the application of the proposed DCID to a small number of indoctrinated personnel. This is unacceptable to us. For example, we consider COMINT to be a "Sensitive Source" requiring much more positive protection than the DCID would require.